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Abstract
There  is considerable  debate  In economics  literatmre  on  ensure that the equilibrium  flow of licensing higher-
whether a decision  by developing countries  to strengthen  qualitv goods  meets  these objectives.  When  the South
their protectiot  of intellectual  property  rights  (IPRs)  will  strengthens  its patent  rights, copying by  licensees is made
increase or  reduce their  access  to modern technologies  costlier but the returns  to licensing are  increased. This
invented  by industrial  countries.  This access  can be  change affects  the dynamilic  decisions  regarding
achieved  through  techniology  transfer  of various kinds,  innaovation  and technology  transfer,  which could  rise  or
including foreign  direct  investimient and  licensing.  fall depending on  market parameters,  including the  labor
Licensing is the  focus of this paper.  available  for research  and  productioni.
To the extent that inventinig firms  choose to act more  Results from  the model  show that the nlet effects
monopolistically  and  offer fewer techinologics  on the  depend on the balance  between  profits made by the
market,  stronger  IPRs could  reduce international  Northcrn  licensor and lower labor costs  in the  South.  If
technology  flows.  However,  to the  extent that IPRs raise  the size of the  labor force used  in  Northern innovation
the  returns to  inniovation and  licenising, these  flows  compared  with that used  in producing goods  in both  the
would cxpand.  In theory,  the outcome depends  on how  North  and  South  Is sufficiently  small  (a conditioni  that
IPRs  affect several variables-the  costs of, and  returnis  to,  accords with reality),  stronger IPRs in  the Soutli  would
international  licensing;  the wage advantage  of workers in  lead to  more licenising and innovation.  This change
poor couLntries;  the inniiovationi  process in  industrial  woould  also  increase the Southerin  wage  relative to the
counitries;  and the amount of labor available  for  Northerni  wage.  So, In this model  a decision  by
innovationi and production.  developing countries  to increase  their patent rights
Yang and Maskus  develop a theoretical  model  in which  would expand global  innovation  and  increase  technology
firms  in the North  (industrial  countries)  innovate  transfer. This result  is consistenit with recent empirical
products of higher quality  levels and  decide  wvhethier  to  evidence.
produce  in the North  or transfer  productioni  rights to the  It should  he noted that while the results  suggest that
South (developing  coLintrics)  through  liccnsinig.  Differcnt  international agreemcnts  to strengthen  IPRs should
quality  levels of each  product are sold  in equilibriulil  expand global innovation and technology  transfer
because  of differences  in consumners'  willingness-to-pay  through  licensing,  the model  cann1ot  be used for welfare
for quality  improvemenits.  Contractinig probleims exist  analysis.  Thus, wvhile  the developing  counatries  enjoy
because  the  inventors  in the North  must indicate to  more  inward licensing,  the cost per license could be
licensees  in the South  wvhether their product is of higher  higher,  and prices could also  rise, with  an  unclear overall
or lower quality  and also  prevent the  licensees  from  effect  on economic well-being.
copying the techinology.  So, constraints  in the modcl
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Intellectual  property rights (IPRs) remain an active subject in international policy debates.
Technology exporters in developed countries argue that stronger IPRs are needed in developing
countries in order to provide  better incentives for innovation and international  technology
transfer.  The recent introduction of global minimum standards for IPRs, through the Agreement
on Trade-Related  Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in the World Trade Organization,  raises
many questions about the relationships among IPRs, technology transfer, and economic growth.
This paper studies the effects of IPRs on innovation and technology transfer in a North-
South dynamic general-equilibrium,  product-cycle model with vertically differentiated products.
Compared to the previous literature,  in which imitation and foreign direct investment (FDI) are
the channels of technology transfer, this model focuses on licensing as the means by which the
South acquires advanced technology from the North.  Licensing embodies features that are
missing in these other channels, namely costs of contracting at arm's-length between innovators
and licensees.  These costs interact with IPRs in important ways.  In particular, we argue that
strengthened patent rights could reduce such costs, raising returns to licensing.  Indeed,  according
to standard internalization theory, relatively weak IPRs protection may cause MNEs to transfer
technological  knowledge through FDI, because there is a risk of dissipation with licensing
(Rugman,  1986).  Therefore, strong IPRs tend to favor licensing because a system of IPRs is
necessary to the enforcement of the licensing contract  (Ferrantino,  1993;  Arora, 1996;  Maskus,
1998).
In practice,  international  licensing through armn's-length contracts and joint ventures have
taken on increasing importance  in recent years (Maskus and Yang, 2001).  For example, as a
3major technology exporting country, US receipts of unaffiliated royalties and license fees were
21% of total royalties and license fees received from all the countries  in the world in 1995.
Imperfections in the market for licensing, such as information  asymmetry, uncertainty,
imitation risk, and transaction costs, have made incorporating licensing into general-equilibrium
models difficult (Caves, et. al, 1983).  This paper provides one means of capturing how IPRs
affect international technology transfer through licensing'.  We focus on two pervasive  problems
in licensing: asymmetric information and imitation risk.  The licensor has an incentive to convey
misinformation about the true quality level of its technology and is unwilling to transfer its
innovation without a payment or commitment by the licensee not to imitate.  In the model, two
different quality levels (high and low) of each product are sold in equilibrium  due to differences
in the willingness to pay of consumers for quality improvements.  Multiple quality levels permit
asymmetric information regarding true quality levels in setting licensing contracts.
With asymmetric information and imitation risk, the licensor is faced with the problem of
designing a contractual  form that signals its technological advantage  while discouraging
imitation (Gallini and Wright 1990).  In consequence, the low-quality licensor can extract full
monopoly rents from the licensee using a fixed fee.  However, the high-quality  licensor must
share rents with the licensee due to a combination of asymmetric information  and the risk of
imitation.  We extend this notion to show that the licensor share increases  with the degree of
IPRs protection in the South.  By endogenizing  this rent share between the licensor and the
licensee, we find that stronger IPRs allow lower-cost signaling of quality levels and generate
more licensing.
With two quality levels sold in equilibrium, production of low-quality goods always takes
place in the South through licensing in order to take advantage of lower labor costs.  However,
4production of high-quality goods may either remain in the North or migrate to the South through
licensing.  The Northern innovative firm first chooses the intensity of effort it devotes to
innovation.  Once innovation  is successful, the firm balances  savings from lower wage costs with
rent sharing in choosing whether to license.
Results from the model show that the effects of IPRs in the South on innovation and
licensing depend on the balance between the rents given up through licensing and lower labor
costs in the South.  Stronger IPRs award the high-quality licensor with a higher rent share,
resulting in greater returns from licensing and innovation.  Whether this change generates
additional innovation and licensing in general equilibrium depends on resource constraints.  Our
key result is that these activities would rise if the labor force used in Northern innovation relative
to that used in global production of both types of goods is sufficiently small.  This condition
seems consistent with reality, in that the share of research and development  in gross domestic
product is far smaller than the corresponding share of mnanufacturing output, even in developed
economies.
This conclusion supports the intuition that stronger global protection of the fruits of R&D
should encourage innovation.  It is more optimistic about the impact of the TRIPS agreement
than were the findings of prior literature.  For example, Helpman (1993) found that with stronger
IPRs protection the rate of innovation would fall in the long run because the North would
produce more goods, taking away resources from innovation.  Glass and Saggi (2002) showed
similarly that a strengthening of IPRs in the South would reduce the rate of innovation because
stronger IPRs would guarantee the market share of innovators.  In turn, more labor would be used
to produce goods in the North, providing less labor for innovation.  Further, the flow and extent
of FDI would decrease  with a strengthening of Southern IPRs due to the increased  imitation risk
5faced by multinationals relative to Northern firms.  However,  Lai (1998) found that the effects of
strengthening IPRs depend crucially on the channel of technology transfer from the North to the
South.  Stronger IPRs in the South would raise the rates of technology  transfer and innovation if
FDI is the channel of technology transfer but would have opposite effects if production is
transferred through imitation.
Our focus on licensing points out that this channel of information transfer would respond
positively to stronger patent rights by virtue of the ability of those rights to reduce the severity of
imperfections in the licensing market.  In an earlier paper (Yang and Maskus, 200 Ia) we found
conditions under which strengthened industrial property would increase licensing and innovation,
though without the contracting  distortions modeled here.  Indeed, limited econometric evidence
suggests that, other things equal, U.S. firms license more to nations with stronger IPRs
(Ferrantino,  1993; Yang and Maskus, 2001b).
The paper proceeds as follows.  In Section 2 we set up a general-equilibrium  model with
licensing as the channel of technology transfer and with two quality levels sold in equilibrium.  In
Section 3 we derive solutions for steady-state  equilibrium and investigate the effects of a
Southern strengthening of IPRs.  Concluding remarks are provided in Section 4.
2. The Model
2.1 Consumers
The consumption  side of the model is closely similar to that in Glass (1997), so we only
highlight its features.  Consider an economy with a continuum of goods indexed byj  [0,  1].
Each good potentially can be improved a countably infinite number of times, indexed by qualities
6m = 0, 1, 2, ....  The increments to quality are common to all products and exogenously given by
a parameter A > 1. Each good may be supplied in all discovered quality levels.
There are two types of consumers,  who differ in their willingness to pay for quality
improvements.  They are indexed by wE(A,B}.  High-type consumers (B) value the same quality
improvement  A more than low-type consumer (A): AB> 2A > 1.
Each type of consumer lives forever and shares identical preference within her group. The
intertemporal utility function for the representative  consumer of type  o is given by
Uw =  f e  -P  u"  (t)dt,  (1)
where p is the subjective discount rate, and u'(t) represents  instantaneous utility at time t.  We
specify instantaneous utility as
u1 0(t)=  I  ln{X(2A)"'dmt,"(])j4  (2)
where dm/0'6) denotes consumption by type  o consumer of quality m of goodj at time t.
Every w-type consumer maximizes discounted utility subject to an intertemporal  budget
constraint
f  CR('11E a(t)dt =A  '(0)  (3)
where R(t) is the cumulative interest factor up to time t: R(t) = fr(s)ds, and A'I(O) is the value of
initial asset holdings plus the present value of factor income of type  c consumers.  The
expenditure flow of type co consumers at time t is given by
Ew(t) =  I  p,lt (j)dt  Q  (1j)dj  (4)
nm=O
7where pm,t1)  is the price of a productj of quality m at time t.  Define aggregate spending by all
consumers as E = E4 + EB.  Letjt describe the exogenously given percentage  of world income
distributed to each type of consumer: f  is distributed to high-type consumers, while f  = I1-J
goes to low-type consumers.  For simplicity, the same distribution of income applies to both
countries.
The consumer's  utility maximization problem can be broken into two stages.  In the first
stage, she optimally allocates lifetime wealth across time. The consumer evenly spreads lifetime
spending across time and the interest rate at each point of time equals the subjective  discount
rate: r(t) = p.  In the second stage, she optimally  allocates spending E(t)  at each point of time.
The composition of spending that maximizes instantaneous  utility is attained when the consumer
allocates an equal expenditure  share to every productj and when she chooses for everyj the
single variety that offers the lowest quality-adjusted price.  If a higher quality good has the same
quality-adjusted  price as a lower quality good, consumers  prefer the former.
Due to heterogeneity  in consumers'  willingness to pay for quality improvement, more
than one quality level is sold in equilibrium. While all consumers agree that quality level m +1 is
better than quality level m, A-type and B-type consumers disagree over how much better.  For a
range of prices, the high-type  consumer selects quality m+l, and the low-type consumer  selects
quality m.  In Appendix A we show that equilibrium with vertical quality differentiation occurs
provided a sufficient percentage  of income is in the hands of high-type consumers.  Firms choose
prices that cause the high-type consumers to self-select  into buying the high-quality level,
whereas low-type consumers buy the low-quality level.  The existence of two quality levels in
equilibrium allows consideration of information asymmetry  in licensing.
82.2 Market Structure
North and South are different in their abilities to conduct "state-of-the-art"  research and
development (R&D).  The North is more productive in R&D and all innovation takes place there
in a steady-state  equilibrium.  In the absence of licensing, the South does not have the technology
to produce either of the top two quality levels by itself.  We assume that imitation by direct
inspection of imported goods is too costly to be economically feasible.  We assume further that
the activities of "inventing around" patents and reverse engineering  are not economically  feasible
given only the information revealed in a patent application.  Thus, licensing is the only means by
which the South can acquire Northern top technologies.  Licensed technologies may be imitated
at some cost.
There  are many firms in the North.  Because two quality levels are sold in equilibrium,
we define firms that had innovated the current highest quality level of any good as "leaders",  and
other firms as "followers".  Following Grossman and Helpman (1991a), we assume that a
Northern producer with an existing technology lead will not conduct research to improve the
quality of its own product.  Therefore, R&D for product improvement is conducted by followers.
In deciding whether to license technology to the South, the Northern licensor is
challenged with the problem of designing a licensing contract that maximizes profits given
market imperfections in licensing.  Markusen (1995) reviews such imperfections,  including
information asymmetry, the non-excludability property of new knowledge, imitation risk, transfer
cost, and moral hazard.
Among these, we consider the problems of information asymmetry and imitation risk
when writing licensing contracts.  Licensors know the true quality of the product, but licensees
recognize that the low-quality  licensor may pretend to have a high-quality product.  Further, the
9licensee could imitate the technology after licensing it in the hope of earning all the monopoly
rents for itself. In this case, the licensor must choose a contractual  form that signals the
informational advantage while discouraging  imitation.
High-quality licensors wish to prevent low-quality licensors  from misrepresenting their
products.  Thus, they must signal their true high quality to allow the licensee to distinguish it
from lower-quality products.  At the same time, they must discourage imitation by licensees after
the technology is transferred.  In our model, the solution to this maximization problem requires
giving up some rents to the licensee.  This rent share operates  as a quality signal and also makes
the licensee unwilling to imitate.  The licensor's rent share is a positive function of imitation
cost, as shown in detail later.  Thus, if the South adopts stronger IPRs the imitation cost of the
licensee would increase  and the licensor would get more rents.  In consequence,  stronger IPRs
allow lower-cost signaling of quality levels.
The high-quality licensor's optimal contract prevents the low-quality licensor from
pretending to be a high-quality licensor.  The low-quality  licensor extracts full rents from its
licensee by offering a contract with the single instrument of a fixed fee equal to those rents.
Because this licensor extracts full rents at the beginning, the licensee has no incentive to imitate.
Imitation would yield zero profit in production but would require expenditure of resources,
making net profits negative.
In this framework, production of low-quality products always takes place in the South
through licensing,  which is more profitable for the licensors due to lower labor costs.  The
property that low-quality technologies are instantaneously licensed to the South eliminates  any
role for obsolescent (that is, third-level) technologies in determining the licensing contract.
However, production of high-quality products may occur either in the North or the South.
10Northern firms first choose the intensity of innovation.  If the innovation is successful, they
would choose whether to license their technology to the South.  Thus, innovative firms must
strike a balance between lower labor costs in the South and the rents given up through licensing.
There are two possible market types for each good.  The first is a high-quality licensed
technology market (H), in which both high-quality and low-quality goods are produced in the
South through licensing.  The second is a low-quality  licensed technology market (L), in which
high-quality goods are produced in the North and low-quality goods are produced in the South
through licensing.  Innovation targets both markets.  When innovation aimed at the H market is
successful the market becomes an L.  The newly innovated highest quality is produced in the
North.  The formerly high-quality good becomes the low-quality good and remains in production
in the South. For its part, when innovation targeting the L market is successful it becomes a new
L, with the original high-quality  good converting  to the low-quality good, which is
instantaneously licensed to the South.
We model licensing of newly innovated,  highest-quality products as a random process.
When successful licensing of a high-quality product occurs, both quality levels will be produced
in the South and the L market becomes an H.  Imitation by the licensee is modeled through its
effect on the rent share between the licensing partners, as noted below.
We preclude the possibility of imitation of licensed technologies  by other Southern firms.
Following Grossman and Helpman (199la), we assume that if such imitation occurred, the
licensee would set price to equal the imitator's marginal cost.  Neither firm would earn positive
profits in the resulting Bertrand competition.  Because there are positive imitation costs, this
situation never arises in equilibrium. We summarize the basic market structure in Figure  1.
11lt  Northe  produce  \
produce high-  low-quality 
quality goods  goods
icense high-  nnovation
ity technology
/  ~H\
/  N~orth  ot 
>  ~~~~~~~prodc
innovate  high & low-
\  ~~~~~~~quality goods  /
Figure  1. Market Structure
2.3 Firms
Innovation and Licensing
Firms spend resources to innovate "state-of-the-art"  products.  Following Grossman and
Helpman (199 lb), we assume that individual research success is a continuous Poisson process.
The probability of success during  any time interval does not depend upon the resources that have
been spent in previous unsuccessful periods.  Thus, a probability of success during any time
12interval is proportional to the intensity of effort during that interval.  A firm that engages in
innovation at intensity i7  for an interval of time length dt succeeds with probability qdt.  This
effort requires a -77 units of labor per unit of time.  The variable  q, which is endogenous, is the
Poisson arrival  rate at which "state of the art" technology will be innovated in the next instant.
After a firm succeeds in innovating a technology yielding a higher-quality product,  it
chooses the location of production and whether to license abroad.  We assume constant marginal
production costs, equal to the Southern wage rate, in order to focus on the case of exclusive
licensing.  If there were increasing marginal costs in Southern production, it could be in the
licensor' s interest to have nonexclusive licensing in order to minimize cost.
The licensing decision is also a random process.  Assume that the duration  rbetween the
time of innovation and the time of licensing has an exponential distribution with cumulative
density Pr(r￿<t)  = 1-  e"  , where i is the endogenous Poisson arrival rate at which the high-quality
technology will be licensed to the South in the next instant. The probability that licensing takes
place in the time interval (t, t+At) is given by iAt, where the good is produced in the North after
innovation up to time t.
The licensor of a high-quality technology faces imitation risk from the licensee.  There  is
no uncertainty involving the imitation process, but imitation costs resources.  These costs depend
positively on the degree of IPRs protection in the South.  Tighter IPRs make it harder to make a
noninfringing,  perfect substitute.
With this background,  consider the innovation process.  Successful innovators attain a
market value of VL', where the subscript stands for market group, and the superscript 1 stands for
"top firm" in that market (the superscript 2 stands for "trailing firm"  in that market).  Each firm
may achieve an expected gain of VL1 7dt, at cost wa qdt, by undertaking R&D at intensity  q for an
13interval dt.  The Northern wage rate is w.  By the zero-profit  condition from free entry and exit in
innovation, we have
VL'  = wa,  17> 0  (5)
Next, consider the decision of Northern  leading firms to license.  All such firms are
symmetric.  At any date, the equilibrium value of i is that which leaves all innovator  firmns
indifferent between licensing and continuing production in the North.  The present discounted
value (PDV) of profits from licensing is a decreasing function of i.  This follows because an
increase in i implies that more production is transferred to the South, raising the demand for
Southern labor.  As the Southern wage increases relative to w, profits from licensing decrease.
Similarly, the PDV of profits from continuing  production in the North is an increasing function
of 1.
Thus, if i is below its equilibrium value, profits from licensing  are higher than those from
Northern production.  More Northern firms transfer their production to the South and z  rises.  If z
is above its equilibrium value, there are gains from moving production back to the North and  i
falls.  It follows that in equilibrium, the expected value from licensing  is equal to the expected
value from continuing production in the North.  The equilibrium licensing condition is
VH  =VL,  I  >O  (6)
where  VH'  is expected lifetime rents from licensing2. It differs from full rents  VH'  when there is
asymmetric  information and imitation risk, as shown below.  The term  VL1 is the expected value
of a leading Northern firm if it continues  production in the North.
14Production and Contracting
In a steady-state equilibrium, each firm's value is constant and equals the present value of
its lifetime profits.  Firms in a low-quality licensing market (L) face the risk of innovation and
the risk of high-quality technology being licensed to the South.  When either of these events
happens, firn  values change.
The steady-state value of the top firm in the low-quality licensing market is given by
V I = XL" + 17VL'  + I  VH  7
(p +  77 +1)
where  ;rL' is the finn's instantaneous profit when innovation  and licensing do not occur.3 If
innovation happens the top firm in the L market would become the trailing firm in the L market
and would earn VL 2. If licensing happens it would become the top firm in the H market and
would earn VH'.  Recall that  ql is the Poisson arrival rate of innovation by followers in the next
instant, and  £ is the Poisson arrival rate at which the high-quality technology will be licensed to
the South in the next instant.
From equations (6) and (7), we get
VL= VHI  =  L7r+  7VL  (8)
(P=+i1)
The trailing firm in the L market would be driven out by successful innovation.  If licensing
occurs it would become the trailing firm in the H market and earn  VH 2. Its steady-state value is
thus
I2  + I  2
(p  +  17 +  1)
where  7CL2 is instantaneous profits in the absence of innovation and licensing.
15Licensees  in the high-quality licensing market (H) face the risk of innovation only.
Recall that there is no imitation from other Southern firms.  The top firm in the high-quality
licensing technology market would become the trailing firm in the L market if innovation
happens.  Its firm value is the following:
VHI  =  (rH  )  77VL  (10)
(p + q7)
where  ;rH' is instantaneous profit in the absence of innovation.
The trailing firm in the high-quality licensing technology market would be driven out if
innovation happens.  Its firm value is
2  I2
VH  H  (I11 
where  ;rH2 is instantaneous profit without innovation.
As discussed earlier, licensors in the H market may not be able to extract full rents from
licensees because of information asymmetry and imitation risk.  We model this situation as a
signaling game.  At the beginning of the game, the licensor has private information about the true
quality level of its product.  A licensor with a high-quality level wishes to convince a potential
licensee of its quality type.  With imperfect IPRs protection in the South the imitation cost of
potential licensees is low.  Thus, revealing quality type through direct inspection is not possible
because the licensee may imitate the product.  Instead, the high-quality licensor needs to signal
its quality type through contract offers.
This game has three stages.  First, the licensor offers a licensing contract,  from which the
licensee may be able to infer the quality type.  The licensee accepts or rejects the offer.  Second,
if the licensee has accepted the contract,  it would pay any contractually  specified, up-front, fixed
16fee, the technology would be transferred,  and the licensee would verify the quality type by
inspection.  Third, the licensee decides whether or not to imitate.  If the licensee imitates it would
achieve  full monopoly rents whereas if the licensee does not imitate it would pay any
contractually specified royalties.
Consider first the low-quality licensor's rent-maximization problem.  We focus on
separating-equilibrium  contracts following Gallini and Wright (1990).  Because the licensor only
faces the problem of imitation,  it can extract full monopoly rents from the licensee by offering  a
contract charging a fixed fee equal to the licensee's monopoly rent (VH2).  Since the licensor
extracts full rents at the beginning, the licensee has no incentive to imitate.  Imitation would yield
zero profit in production but would cost resources and make net profit negative.
The high-quality licensor's rent-maximizing problem is different.  When designing the
licensing contract, the high-quality licensor faces two challenges.  On the one hand, the firm must
inform the potential licensee of the quality type before the contract is signed without revealing
the specifics of the technology.  On the other hand, the rent-maximizing  payment schedule must
discourage imitation after the contract has been accepted and the technology has been transferred.
Thus, consider the separating-equilibrium  contract for the high-quality  licensor.  Let F be
the up-front fixed fee, ythe royalty rate, and C(k) the imitation cost by the licensee, where k is the
degree of IPRs protection and C'(k) >  0.  For simplicity, let C(k) = kC.  The licensor's problem is
as follows:
Max (F + YVH)
S.T.  VH 1 - y v i - F  0  (rationality)
VH  - Y  VH-  - FV'-kC  - F  (no imitation)
F  + y VH 2 < VH 2 (separation)
I7The maximum  rents for the licensor that can be generated from this problem are  VH'  = kC
+(-r)  VH2, where y= - ,  and  VH'  <  VHI.  It follows that the maximum rents  VH' are
VH
VH  VH  + OkC,  (12)
where  9= (VH - V  . The ratio 9 is the marginal value that the licensor would achieve if
VH
imitation cost were to increase by one unit (see Appendix B).  It depends on the difference
between the rents of the high-quality licensor and the low-quality licensor.  In summary, the
high-quality licensor must give up some rents to the licensee in order to signal its quality type.
From equation (12), the licensor's rents are positively related to imitation cost kC.  If IPRs
protection  were made tighter in the South (k were higher), the imitation cost kC would rise and
the licensor would earn more rents.  This system endogenizes  the rent share between licensor and
licensee  as a function of the degree of IPRs.
Next consider the instantaneous  profits earned by each kind of firm.  In this model, firms
use limit-pricing strategy to prevent entry of their closest competitors.  In an L market the
Southern licensee producing the low- quality product  sets price  against Southern firms residing
one quality below.  It sets its quality- adjusted  price  P  to equal the marginal  cost of its
competitor.  We assume that each additional  output unit requires one labor unit.  Thus, the
marginal cost of production is w in the North and we normalize the Southern wage rate at unity.
2  ~~~~E  A It follows that PL2 =  A. The trailing firm sells-A  units of output and earns
1L  = EA (1  I  EA (1-  _  )  (13)
18where  8A  =  A
The top firm in the L market produces the high-quality product in the North.  It prices
against the trailing firm and sets PL'  = AB  A, selling  EB  units of output. It earns
7TLI  = EB(1  ABJ_  =EB(l1-W5Aa5B)  (14)
where  SB=
In the H market the trailing firm is a Southern licensee producing the low-quality product.
It prices against Southern firms residing one quality below,  sets PH2 = AA,  and earns
2j  =  E (1-i-A)  = E (1 _A)  (15)
The top firm in the H market is a Southern licensee  producing the high-quality product.
It prices against the trailing firm, sets PHI = AB  A, and earns
7 ZH  = EB  (1I  )  E B(l1  _A8B)  (16)
Note that  2rL  =  irH2, because low-quality products are produced  in the South with the
same marginal costs.  From this, it is easy to show that
2  ~~~~2
V2  =  VH2  =  H  =  (17
VL  V  (PH+(77)  (P+7)  (17)
These limit-pricing outcomes are supported by a Nash-equilibrium pair of firm strategies
in a repeated game with an infinite number of repetitions.  The firm wants to maximize its
expected value instead of its instantaneous profits in an infinite horizon.  If it were a one-shot
game, with more than one quality level of a product sold in equilibrium, the limit price chosen by
19the top firm in a separating  equilibrium would allow the trailing firm to lower its own price by a
small amount and capture the entire market.  But in a repeated  game if the trailing firm were to
undercut the top firm's price in the first period, the top firm could punish it in all following
periods and make its profits zero forever.  Therefore, as long as the discount rate is not too high,
the above limit-price outcomes will be an equilibrium.  The top firm can limit-price against the
trailing firm even if the trailing firm prices above cost.
Resource Market Clearance
In equilibrium,  all resources  are fully used for production and innovation in both the
North and South. We only have one input, labor.  Let the labor supply in the North be DN and the
labor supply in the South be Ds, where both are exogenously  given.  We denote the measure of
the high-quality licensing market  as nH and the measure of the low-quality licensing market as
nL.  The Northern  labor-market clearance  condition  is
a77(nH + nL)  + nL EB a  = DN  (18)
The first term represents  labor resources used in innovation and the second term represents  labor
used in producing high-quality goods.  The Southern labor-market clearance  condition is given by
EA  A+  nH E  aB  a=  Ds  (19)
The first term is labor used in producing low-quality products and the second term is labor used
in the production of high-quality products.
Constant Steady-State Market Shares
In a steady-state equilibrium, measures of products produced in the L and H markets are
constant. Recall that nL denotes  the proportion of industries with high-quality products produced
in the North and low-quality products produced in the South, while nH denotes the proportion of
industries with both high-quality and low-quality products  licensed to the South.  Thus, the flow
20of production out of the L market must be the same as that into the H market, and the flow of
production out of the H market must be the samne as that into the H market, as indicated in
equation (20):
t nL =  11  nH  (20)
The flow out of the L market is  77 nLdt +  z  nLdt for an interval  dt.  The flow into the L market is
77 nLdt +  77 nHdt for an interval dt.  Further,
nL  + nH= 1  (21)
3. Steady-State Equilibrium and the Effects of IPRs
3.1 Steady-State Equilibrium
Define  0 as the aggregate rate of licensing high-quality technology:  0 = i nL . From
equations (20) and (21), nH =  - = n, which we term the extent of high-quality licensing.  The
?7
task is to solve for four endogenous variables  (77,  n, E,  and w) in terms of the exogenous
variables.
The resource  constraints (18) and (19) may be solved for aggregate expenditure  E:
E=  DN +DS~-a77  (2
E  (1 _ f B)gA  + fB6A6B  (22)
Recall thatjf4 is the share of income accruing to the high-valuation consumers.  Eliminating E
from equation (18) using equation (22), a joint resource constraint in terms of endogenous
variables  Q and n is derived:
aq + (1 - n)(DN + Ds - a77)p = DN  (23)
21where,(  f  BJ  )A  +  B5A  . Equation (23) gives the relationship between innovation  q7
and high-quality licensing n when resource constraints in both the North and the South are
satisfied.  Taking total derivatives of this equation shows that  d7 > O and d7 < 0.  Therefore,
dn  dn2
as n increases  77 rises also but at a decreasing rate.  The intuition behind this positive relationship
is straightforward.  When licensing goes up more production is transferred to the South, making
more resources in the North available for innovation.
Substituting equations  (8), (9), (11),  (12), (13), (14), (15), and (17) into equations (5) and
(6) yields the following valuation equations:
(wa -OkC)(p  + rl) = E(1-f  )(1  _5A)  (24)
pwa =  EfB (1-w'A5'B) - kC  (25)
Eliminating w from equations (24)  and (25), we get a joint valuation equation:
a(p +  n1)(Ef - qOkC)  = [E(1 -fe)(I  - o)  + (p + nk9kC](ap+E/Bo 8 )  (26)
Note that n has no effect on this joint valuation equation,  since E depends on  77  only in equation
(22).
We depict the combinations of 77 and n that satisfy the joint resource constraint (equation
(23)) as the curve labeled DC in Figure 2.  It is positively sloped  and concave.  The curve labeled
VC in Figure 2 shows the combinations of q and n that satisfy the joint valuation equation (26).
The intersection between DC and VC gives the steady-state equilibrium rates of innovation and
licensing.
22Figure 2: Steady-State  Innovation and Licensing
Innovation
DC
'q2*  vC 2
n2  n  ni  The Extent of High-quality Licensing
3.2 Comparative Statics
Innovation and Technology  Transfer
We now study the effects of tighter IPRs protection in the South.  The impacts on
equilibrium  rates of innovation  and technology transfer may be derived using the joint resource
constraint  (23) and the joint valuation equation (26).  The protection of IPRs is built into the
model through imitation cost of the licensee.  If IPRs were  strengthened kC would increase.  Note
that k appears only in the joint valuation equation (26) and has no effect on the joint resource
constraint.  However,  by affecting innovation, IPRs alter technology transfer through the resource
constraints.
23To determine the effect of IPRs on innovation through the joint valuation equation,
substitute E from equation (22) into equation (26) and take total derivatives to achieve an
expression  for  dk  Equivalently, totally differentiate equations (24) and (25) to arrive at a
d77  dw
system of equations  for  and  d.  Appendix D solves this equation system and shows that
dk  dk
the sign of dq could be positive  or negative.  Therefore, in response to stronger IPRs in the
dk
South, the VC curve in Figure  2 could shift up or shift down and the effects of IPRs on
innovation and the extent of licensing are ambiguous.
We resolve this anbiguity in Appendix D by deriving a sufficient condition for  dk  to be
dk
positive.4 This condition holds if the ratio of labor used in innovation to labor used in
production of goods of both quality levels in the world is lower than a critical value  P*,  where
P*  is less than unity and depends on parameter values of a 5A,  B, and  f B.  In this case, the VC
curve would shift up to VC1 in Figure 2.  Thus, with stronger IPRs protection in the South, both
innovation (ii) and licensing (n*) would increase.  We summarize  our results in Proposition I.
Proposition  I
If the size of the labor  force used in innovation relative to that used in the production of
goods in the world is sufficiently small, stronger IPRs in the South would lead  to both a higher
rate of innovation and a higher extent of licensing high-quality technology.
24The intuition behind Proposition I is as follows.  In choosing whether to license a
successfully  innovated technology to the South, Northern firms must find a balance between
lower labor cost in the South and the rents given up through licensing.  If tighter IPRs protection
were adopted in the South, the rents that the licensor must sacrifice to prevent imitation from the
licensee would decrease.  Thus,  the rents from licensing would rise and so would the return from
innovation.  However, if the resulting increase  in labor demand in innovation were high,
considerable  resources would be drawn away from Northern production.  In turn, this would
markedly raise demand for Southern labor to produce both high-quality and low-quality goods,
causing the Southern relative wage to increase and the Southern labor cost advantage to decrease.
Only when the labor force used in innovation relative to that used in production is small would
innovation in the North not force up the Southern wage enough to overturn its labor-cost
advantage.  In this case, an increase in licensing rents with stronger IPRs protection  would give
Northern innovative firms a larger incentive to innovate  and these firms would transfer more
high-quality production to the South through additional licensing.
Relative Wage Between  the North and South
Appendix D shows that the derivatives  dw  and  dd  have opposite  signs.  Therefore we
have Proposition II.
25Proposition  II
If stronger IPRs in the South cause innovation and  technology transfer to increase, the
relative Southern wage (-)  would rise.  However, if  stronger IPRs cause innovation and
w
technology transfer to decrease, the relative Southern wage wouldfall.
The intuition behind Proposition II is as follows.  On the one hand, when innovation rises
the demand  for Northern labor goes up and the Northern relative wage increases  (the Southern
relative wage decreases).  On the other hand, when there is more technology transfer to the South
(n increases),  the demand for Southern labor goes up and therefore the Southern relative wage
rises.  Recall that the sufficient condition for innovation to rise is that innovation  demands a
small share of labor resources.  Thus, when this condition holds the latter effect would dominate
and the Southern relative wage would rise with more innovation and licensing.
4. Conclusions
Licensing as a channel of technology transfer from the North to South has been ignored in
the literature.  We develop a model of licensing contracts in imperfect markets to study the
effects of IPRs on innovation and technology transfer in a dynamic general-equilibrium,  product-
cycle model with multiple product qualities.  The novel features here are the incorporation of
asymmetric  information and imitation risk in licensing into a general-equilibrium  framework and
the endogenization  of the rent share between the licensor and the licensee as a function of the
degree of IPRs in the South.
26Results from the model show that stronger IPRs in the South would increase the rate of
innovation and the extent of high-quality licensing from the North to the South under a particular
condition.  Specifically, this outcome requires that the labor force used in innovation,  compared
to that used in the production of goods anywhere  in the world, is sufficiently small and that there
remains a relatively large advantage of lower labor cost in the South.  This condition seems
consistent with reality, for the innovation sectors in even the developed countries (measured by
the share of R&D) rarely exceeds three percent of GDP while production activity in the world is
far larger.  These results are different from prior major findings in the literature, in which
stronger IPRs in the South would reduce the rates of innovation and technology transfer when
imitation and FDI are channels of technology transfer.  Our results are more optimistic about the
impacts of stronger IPRs as mandated by the TRIPs agreements under the WTO.
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29Appendix  A.  Condition for Separation
In the L market, if a top firm chooses pooling,  it would charge  pP  =  2A  (where the
superscript P indicates pooling) because it wants to capture the whole market.  It sells  -A  units of
products and earns instantaneous profits arP  = E(1 - =  E(1 - wSA)  . The top firm's expected
p~~~~~~~
value is  PI  =  -
P+77
If the top firm chooses separation  (here labeled with superscript S), it would charge
EB
p.5 _  2A 2 B  ~It sells  AAB  units of products, and earn instantaneous  profits
UT =Ef8 (1-  a  w).  Its expected  firm value is P  =  + IVL
Separation occurs in the L market iff V s > V P  Thus  'rs  > or P  is a sufficient condition that
separation will happen.  The condition  7ts> irr is satisfied iff  B  >  I  _AW
Similarly, in the H market, under pooling the top firm would charge  pP  =  2A and get
instantaneous profits irp  = E(1- +)  = E(1I  dA),  The firm has expected value
I,~ ~  ~  ~~z
VT  =  - . Under separation,  it would charge  pS  =  AA2B and get instantaneous profits
p+77
ir= Ef B(l _  AtB),  Its expected firm value is V =  ,  +  . Separation is assured by
p+77
rCs>rTP,  therefore, separation occurs if f 8 >  I _
If separation occurs in the H market, it will also occur in the L market, because if
fB  >  l-AS,  then fB >  ISAW  holds automatically.  Therefore, separation occurs in
I1  gA 3 B  ,thn  lSABW~
both the H and L markets if fBiS greater than  . In other words,  separation occurs if 1  _-  A.,
high-valuation consumers have a sufficiently high income share.
30Appendix  B. Rent Maximization for the High-Quality Licensor
First, we show that  VH  > VH 2 in this model.  From equations (10) and (I 1) we see that
2  E[(o  + 7)f  B(l _SAgB)  _-p(l_fB)(I  _A)]
VH  -VH  (P + 17)2  (BI)
From the condition  f  B  >  DjXDj_  in Appendix A, it follows immediately that
VH 1 - VH  2>  0.
Next we solve the rent-maximizing  problem for the high-quality licensor.  The
Lagrangian function for the high-quality licensor's problem is as follows:
L = F +  VH 1 + E (VH  -Y  VH  - F) + v (kC - r  VH)  +  ,  (VH  - F - y VH 2 )
The Kuhn-Tucker  conditions are:
dL/oF=I-e- < 0  1  F20  (1k)
dLky =  VH'  - VH'- VVH,  -V,  0  ±  V0  (2k)
dL/=  VH-  F - r VHI 20  2 0  (3k)
o3dL9vkC- yVVH1 >O  °  v20  (4k)
0L/C9I  VH2-F-yVH2  0  1  p  0  (5k)
where I denotes the complementary-slackness  condition (if A  2 0 and B Ž0 then AB  0).
Three exhaustive cases are considered:
Case I: F>  0 and y= 0; Case II: F=  0 andy> 0; Case III: F>0 andy> 0.
It is easy to show there are no solutions for Case I and Case II given that VHI > VH 2 and kC >0.
Only Case III is left.  There are eight different sub-cases for Case III:
(a)s=  0, v=0,f=0;  (e)e=0, v=0,,B>0;
(b) 6>0, v  0,,B-0;  (f)e >0, v =0,,B>0;
(c) g =0, v >0,18=0;  (g)e  =0, v >0,,7>  0;
(d) e >0, v >0,,B=0;  (h) e >0, v >0,,8>0;
Sub-cases (a) to (f) and sub-case (h) can be ruled out easily because of conflicts among
different conditions.  Thus, only sub-case (g) is left.  The solution for sub-case (g) is as follows:
e +±, = l and  B= 1, e= 0  (6k)  (from (lk) and (g))
31(I -v)  VH  = VH2 and  v =  -,,  (7k)  (from (2k) and (6k))
VH
F  + Y VH'  I  VH  (8k)  (from (3k) and e = 0)
Y VHI  = kC  (9k)  (from (4k) and  v  > 0)
F +  Y  VH 2 =  VH 2 (1Ok)  (from (5k) and  l  > 0)
From equations (9k) and (1Ok)  we get F + Y VH  = kC + (J-y)  VH 2 = VH 2 +  9kC and
y =  k  (here we have substituted  O  for v, with 0 being the ratio used in the text).  In Appendix C
VH
we show that  VH,  > VH
2 +91kC in this model.  Therefore, the maximum rents for the licensor are
VH2 + MkC.  In summary, to have an optimal solution for this problem, both F and ymust be
positive, both the non-imitation and the separation constraints  are binding, and the rationality
constraint is not binding.  As a result, the licensor has to share some rents with the licensee.
Because the objective function is concave and the constraints are convex, the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions are necessary and sufficient.
Appendix  C. The Condition  9kC < VH  - Vf
From the equilibrium licensing condition [equation (6)], we have
EfB(1  _8AgBW)-  P  E(1  f1B)(1 _,A)  = (p+  i?)9kC  (C1)
P±+77
From equations (C1), (B 1),  and the assumption w > 1, we have
Ek<[(  p + C)fl  (1- _  AB)-_p(l  _ f  B)(I  _  A  )]  1 
OkC <  (p + r)2 VH  _  H
Appendix  D.  The sign of  d  and  dw
d(kC)  d(kC)
Total differentiation  of equations  (24) and (25) give a system of equations:
32a( p + r7)  [(wa - OkC)  _  (p + 77)(kC)  d-  (1-  f  8)(1 _ 6B) dE  dw 
d77  diq  dkC  _  1
(pa + Ef  B5A6B)  [RkC +  7kC dO _ f  B(1 _ WAA6B)  dEI  dq  _ 1 -70
dq  ~~~dq  7  dKC 
Let A to be the first matrix of the left-hand side, and B to be the matrix of the right hand
side, then
dw




HI = p6tOkC  f  B (I_W  A5 B)  dEl  + r 7 9{wa  -[(If  B)(l_6B) + f  R(IWSASB)]  >0
dq  dq
since-<  O,  and  H2 =_9(P  +  7)[pa +  Ef  BAB]qa(p  + q) < 0.
dq
Therefore,  no matter what the sign of JAI is,  d7  and  dw  have opposite  signs.
d(kC)  d(kC)
The sign of the determinant JAI  and the sign of H2 decide the sign of dr'  For analytical
simplicity,  JAI  is derived for the case p = 0.  It can be shown that if (  7  D  < p,  then
(D,v-  a  q) +Ds
JAI  <0 and therefore  - >  0,  where  P  =  (I  _-5A)(I  f  B)SA  + f  is  y dk  (1-_,  SASB)[kl  _-  JB ),A + f  B 8 5A,5B  .It  sesoso
that P*  < 1. Recall aq is the labor used in innovation,  and  (DN  - aq/) + DS  is the labor used in
the production of high-quality and low-quality goods.
33ENDNOTES
I Ethier (1986) first incorporated informational  asymmetry in licensing into a general equilibrium
framework.  However, he focused on conditions to achieve incentive-compatible  arm's-length
contract and the choice between FDI and licensing.  We solve for a specified incentive-
compatible licensing contract when there are both informational asymmetry and imitation risk.
2 Licensing also costs resources  in transferring the "know-how" (see Teece,  1976).  Here
transaction costs in licensing  are set to zero for simplicity.
3Determination of these profit flows is taken up later in this section.
4 For analytical  simplicity, the results for case of p = 0 are derived.  For cases where  p ￿  0
numerical results will be provided upon request.
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